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Abstract
We deﬁne a quantitative temporal logic that is based on a simple modality within the framework of
monadic predicate logic. Its canonical model is the real line (and not an ω-sequence of some type). It can
be interpreted either by behaviors with ﬁnite variability or by unrestricted behaviors. For ﬁnite variability
models it is as expressive as any logic suggested in the literature. For unrestricted behaviors our treatment
is new. In both cases we prove decidability and complexity bounds using general theorems from logic (and
not from automata theory). The technical proof uses a sublanguage of the metric monadic logic of order,
the language of timer normal form formulas. Metric formulas are reduced to timer normal form and timer
normal form formulas allow elimination of the metric.
© 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Temporal logic (TL) is a convenient framework for reasoning about the evolving of a system in
time. This made TL a popular subject in the Computer Science community and it enjoyed extensive
research during the last 20 years. A celebrated theorem byKamp [14] proves that the temporal logic
based on the two modalities “Since” and “Until” has the same expressive power as the Monadic
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ﬁrst-order predicate logic, whether time is taken as the set of natural numbers (discrete time) or
as the set of non-negative real numbers (continuous time). For discrete time there is also a tight
connection between second-order predicate logic and automata theory [5], associating with every
formula an automaton that accepts exactly the runs that satisfy the formula. In particular this
associates also an automaton with every ﬁrst-order logical formula. In classical logic, constructing
the automaton that corresponds to a ﬁrst-order formula is neither simpler nor more direct than for
second-order formulae. In contrast, for temporal logic the construction of the automaton is more
straightforward. This may have contributed to the popularity of temporal logic for the treatment
of discrete time.
When it came to continuous timemodels, most of the researchers decided to abandon the natural
model of the real line in favor of discrete models in which the elements of the sequence were deco-
rated by some information concerning the real line. This may have been an attempt to pursue the
connection with automata theory, as automata were traditionally associated with sequences. We
believe that this decision had far reaching consequences that complicated the subsequent research
enormously. First, the theory could only deal with systems that satisﬁed a ﬁnite variability condition
and it did not apply to the behavior of general systems in time (of course, once a general formalism
exists it may be worthwhile to modify it to ease the treatment of a favorite family). In some of the
approaches it is not even clear which ﬁnite variability model was intended. Second, the equivalence
between ﬁrst-order classical logic and temporal logic that held in the real line by Kamp’s theorem
was lost. It followed that the choice of a particular temporal logic became an arbitrary choice. It
could not be proved robust by the usual argument that it has the same expressive power as classical
logic.
Things got worse when the time came to introduce metric into the logic. The pair of timed se-
quences together with temporal logic is a poor setting for it. When dealing with the real line in
predicate logic the addition of the + function is just a trivial change in the signature of the logic.
The resulting logic is rich and it is the natural place to look for sublogics that express different
properties of the metric. This obvious approach has no counterpart when the model is a sequence
and the logic is a temporal logic. Thus a host of different formalisms was introduced which, com-
bined with the different sequential models, produced an astonishing variety of “model-logic” pairs.
In spite of the efforts invested over the years the research did not converge toward an accepted
sequential model and an appropriate metric temporal logic.
In this paper, we adopt the classical approach and assume that the underlining model is the
ordered real line itself with unary predicates corresponding to properties that may or may not hold
at each point. In Section 2 we describe the classical background; we deﬁne the predicate monadic
logic of order, and we cite the main decidability results for this logic: for ﬁrst and for second order
logic, for ﬁnite variability models, and for unrestricted models. All the later decidability results for
the metric case will be achieved by reduction to these non-metric results. In Section 3 we enrich
the language, adding to it the +1 function. The resulting logic is undecidable and the rest of the
paper concerns itself with identifying a good sublanguage and checking its properties. First how-
ever we introduce the main technical notion that we use, the timer. A predicate X is a timer for the
predicate Y if X holds exactly at points where Y has been holding continuously for the last unit
of time. Formulas in timer normal form use the +1 only to say that one predicate is a timer for
another one. In Section 4 we prove the main technical “metric elimination” result: there is a simple
algorithm (simple to apply, not simple to prove correct) which associates with any timer normal
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form formula, a formula which does not mention the metric, such that one formula is satisﬁable if
and only if the other is. This reduces the questions on decidability for timer normal form onto the
corresponding question in the non-metric case. In Section 5 we tend to temporal logic and recall its
main properties, in particular Kamp’s theorem about the equivalence between temporal logic and
monadic ﬁrst-order logic of order. In Section 6 we deﬁne the temporal logic QTL—quantitative
temporal logic. In addition to the “Until” and “Since” modalities it has two very simple metric
constructs. These are the constructs “ϕ will happen within one unit of time," and “ϕ has happened
within the last unit of time." These constructs are easily deﬁned in the monadic predicate logic with
the +1 function. This also gives rise to the natural language QMLO—quantitative monadic logic
of order. We show that with the added expressive power the temporal logic and the classical logic
are still equivalent in expressive power.
In Section 7, we show that these simple metric logics are quite expressive. We show that they can
express seemingly stronger alternative connectives, in particular all the connectives that we found
in the literature. In Section 8 we give an algorithm to reduce QMLO and QTL formulas to timer
normal form formulas. We utilize the decidability theorem for timer formulas to prove decidability
for QTL and QMLO in the class of general behaviors, as well as in the class of ﬁnite variability
behaviors (remember that the general behaviors could not even be represented using the method of
timed sequences, let alone proved decidable).
Finally in Section 9, we determine the complexity of our algorithms. We apply automata-free
proofs of the complexity of pure temporal logic to show that the satisﬁability is PSPACE whether
we want the answer in general behaviors or in ﬁnite variability behaviors. For ﬁnite variability
behaviors this result was known [1]. We stress the fact that our proof does not rely on automata
theory, so that there is no evidence that automata can give tighter estimates, even in the special
cases when they apply.
The main results of this paper were announced in [12]. A survey and detailed comparison with
other approaches, models and logics was provided without proofs in [13].
2. Monadic logic of order
The most natural language to discuss systems that evolve in time is classical predicate logic. The
language has a name for the (discrete or continuous) order relation of the time line, and a supply of
unary predicates each to denote a property which the system may or may not have at any point in
time. This leads to the following deﬁnition of the syntax and the semantics of the pure (non-metric)
monadic predicate logic:
The syntax of themonadic predicate logic of order—MLO has in its vocabulary individual (ﬁrst-
order) variables t0, t1, . . . , monadic predicate names X0,X1, . . . , and one binary relation < (the
order). Atomic formulas are of the form X(t), t1 < t2 and t1 = t2. Well formed formulas of the
monadic logicMLO are obtained from atomic formulas using Boolean connectives ¬,∨,∧,→ and
the (ﬁrst-order) quantiﬁers ∃t and ∀t. Second-order monadic logic of order formulas are obtained
using also second-order quantiﬁers ∃X and ∀X .
Warning on terminology: in this work we are mainly interested in ﬁrst-order monadic logic of
order, and unless second order is explicitly mentioned the name MLO is reserved for ﬁrst-order
logic.
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A structure forMLO is a pairM = 〈A,<〉where< is a linear order over A. To be exact a structure
M = 〈A,<, P1, · · · , Pn〉may have some predetermined ﬁxed one-place predicates (sets) P1, · · · , Pn, but
we shall use the simple notation 〈A,<〉 when the particular special predicates are not essential to
the discussion.
The important examples for us are 〈R+,<〉 and 〈N ,<〉; the non-negative real line and the non-
negative integers.
We shall not repeat the standard inductive deﬁnition saying when is a formula satisﬁed.We recall
the notation:
M , 1, . . . k; P1, . . . , |=
MLO
ϕ(t1, . . . , tk;X1, . . . ,Xm),
which we also abbreviate toM |= ϕ[1, . . . , k; P1, . . . , Pm] or even toM |= ϕ[, P ]whereM is a struc-
ture, 1, . . . , k are elements ofM , P1 · · · , Pm are unary predicates (i.e., sets) inM , ϕ is a formula and
t1, · · · tk;X1, . . . ,Xm include all the variables of ϕ.
The non-negative real line 〈R+,<〉 and the non-negative integers 〈N ,<〉, respectively, are called
the continuous canonical model and the discrete canonical model.
Finite variability: a function  from a bounded interval I (of reals or rationals) into a set  has
ﬁnite variability if there exists a partition of I into a ﬁnite sequence I1, . . . , Ik of subintervals such
that  is constant on every subinterval Ij (j = 1, . . . , k). A function  from reals or rationals has
ﬁnite variability if the restriction of  on every bounded interval has ﬁnite variability.
Fromtheabovedeﬁnition it follows that a function fromabounded subinterval (a, b)of the reals
into a sethas ﬁnite variability if there exists a ﬁnite increasing sequence a = a0 < a1 < · · · < an = b
such that  is constant on every interval (ai, ai+1). A function  from the non-negative-real lineR+ in-
toa sethasﬁnite variability if there exists an increasingunboundedω-sequence0 = a0 < a1 < · · · <
an < · · · such that  is constant on every interval (ai, ai+1).
In the computer science literature it is often assumed that a system has ﬁnite variability; i.e., that
every monadic predicate involved has ﬁnite variability (we identify predicates with their character-
istic functions).
The (ﬁrst or second order) ﬁnite variability monadic logic of order is syntactically the logic intro-
duced before with the additional assumption concerning the semantics that all the predicate names
and second-order variables range over ﬁnite variability predicates.
Remark 1 (About ﬁnite variability).
1. The distinction between the class of models with ﬁnite variability and the class of unrestricted
models is signiﬁcant also for ﬁrst-order monadic logic. It is easy to express in ﬁrst-order language
the fact that any non-singular interval has a point where the predicate X holds and a point where
¬X holds. This formula is satisﬁable in the class of unrestricted models but not in the class of
ﬁnite variability models.
2. In the real line model ﬁnite variability can be deﬁned by a ﬁrst-order formula: the predicate X
has ﬁnite variability iff it satisﬁes the formula
∀t∃t1[(t < t1) ∧ ∀t2(t < t2 < t1)→(X(t2)↔ X(t1)]∧
∀t > 0∃t1[(t1 < t) ∧ ∀t2(t1 < t2 < t)→(X(t2)↔ X(t1)]
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(t > 0 can be written as ∃s(s < t)).
3. In contrast, over the rational line ﬁnite variability can be deﬁned by a second-order monadic
formula but not by a ﬁrst-order one.
Here are the main decidability results concerning the monadic logic of order:
Theorem 2.
1.The satisﬁability of monadic ﬁrst-order logic of order over the reals is decidable [6].
2.The satisﬁability of monadic second-order logic of order over the reals is undecidable [20].
3.The satisﬁability of monadic second-order logic over the reals with ﬁnite variability interpretation
is decidable [17].
4.The satisﬁability of monadic second-order logic over the rationals is decidable [16].
3. Metric monadic logic and timer formulas
The logicMLO is not suitable to deal with quantitative statements like “X will occur within one
unit of time,” which are needed for the speciﬁcations of systems. A natural strengthening of the
language can be obtained by including in it a name for the two place addition function +. A more
cautious approach is to include the unary function t + 1 as a function or as a binary relation. It
turns out that even this is too generous and it yields an undecidable logic. Nevertheless we shall use
this metric logic as a framework in which we look for useful decidable fragments.
Deﬁnition 3.MLO+, the monadic logic of order with a +1 function, is the ﬁrst-order logic built from
the binary relation <, monadic predicate names, and one unary function symbol which we denote
either by S(t) or by t + 1. The standard (canonical) model for this logic is the non-negative real line
with the usual +1 function and the usual order relation.
We introduce the following suggestive notations:
(∃v)<t>sϕ ≡ ∃v((s < v < t) ∧ ϕ) and (∀v)<t>sϕ ≡ ∀v((s < v < t)→ ϕ),
where t and s are terms in the language. We do not have substraction in the language and we deﬁne
(∃v)<t>t−1ϕ ≡ ∃v(t < v+ 1 < t + 1 ∧ ϕ).
Note that for points t smaller than 1 it just means that there is some previous v satisfying ϕ. We
deﬁne similarly (∀v)<t>t−1ϕ (note that (∀v)<t>t−1ϕwill always be satisﬁed at t = 0).We shall also extend
these notations to include weak inequalities instead of sharp ones.
Our strategy is the following: we identify a basic metrical connection between pairs of predicates
that we call “Q is a timer for P”: Q holds whenever P has been true for the entire last unit of time.
For any metric logic (ﬁrst or second order, and later temporal logic) we identify the sublanguage
of formulas in timer normal form. These are formulas in which the metric enters only as a means to
claim that one predicate is a timer for another, and all the rest is non-metrical. Our interest in this
seemingly unnatural language is due to the following features:
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• The timer relation can be approximated by a non-metrical formula in such a way that every
formula in timer normal form gives rise to a non-metrical formula such that the two formulas
are both valid, or both invalid.
• Thus decidability for formulas in timer normal form follows from the decidability of the corre-
sponding non-metrical logic.
• In fact even the complexity of the problem can be reduced to the non-metrical logic.
Therefore the search for decidable metrical logic may be replaced by a search for logics for which
every formula is effectively equivalent to a formula in timer normal form. One more feature of the
language of formulas in timer normal form is:
1. There are very interesting logics which allow an effective translation to timer normal form.
We deﬁne the notion of Timer by a formula ofMLO
+
:
Deﬁnition 4 (Timer normal form).
1. We call the followingMLO
+
formula a simple Timer Formula
Timer(X , Y) ≡ ∀t(Y(t)←→ (∀t1)<t>t−1X(t1))
(X is different from Y ). We say that Y is a timer for X .
2. For every n we deﬁne the formula:
Timern(X1, . . . Xn, Y1, . . . Yn) ≡
∧
i
Timer(Xi, Yi).
(All 2n variables are different from each other.)
3. A formula is said to be in ﬁrst-order (second order) timer normal form if it has the form
∃W (Timern(X1, . . . ,Xn, Y1, . . . , Yn) ∧ ϕ),
where W is a list of monadic variables and ϕ is (non-metrical) ﬁrst-order (or second order)
monadic, respectively.
Note that whether or not X has ﬁnite variability a timer Y for X always has. Note also that
by its deﬁnition a timer Y holds on a (topologically) closed set. By its deﬁnition, if Y does not
holds at t and will hold in the future then there is a ﬁrst point after t where Y holds, and it
is preceded by an interval of length one where Y does not hold. Since a ﬁnite interval contains
only ﬁnitely many disjoint interval of length one Y can change its value only ﬁnitely often in a
ﬁnite interval.
The set of formulas in timer normal form is (semantically) closed under conjunctions, disjunc-
tions, and the preﬁxing of existential predicate quantiﬁers. The transformations to timer normal
form may involve change of variables. For example, Timer(X , Y) ∧ Timer(Y ,Z) is equivalent to
∃W Timer(X , Y) ∧ Timer(W ,Z) ∧ ∀t(Y(t)↔ W(t)). Formulas in timer normal form are also closed
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(up to equivalence) under the substitution of a metric-free formula in place of a free predicate
variable: instead of substituting ϕ for X we may simply add the conjunct ∀t(X(t)↔ ϕ(t)) to the
matrix and add the preﬁx ∃X to the whole formula. It is easy to see that up to simple syntactic
transformation the resulting formula is in timer normal form.
Remark 5 (Other “timers”). In the deﬁnition of “timer” above Y is a “past persistency timer” for
X as it measures that X persisted at least for one unit period in the past. This is the timer that we
chose as our basic timer. Three other timers are the “past occurrence timer” which is active if X was
true at least at one point in the past unit interval, and the future persistence and future occurrence
timers which are deﬁned similarly. These three timers can be expressed by timer normal formulas.
1. The past occurrence timer is deﬁned as follows: ∀t(Y(t)←→ (∃t1)<t>t−1X(t1)). This formula is equiv-
alent to the following formula: ∃Z(Timer(¬X ,Z) ∧ ∀t(Y(t)←→ ¬Z(t)).
2. The future occurrence timer is ∀t(Y(t)←→ (∃s)<t+1>t X(s))). To use the convenience of the tempo-
ral logic notations we delay the proof that the future occurrence timer is expressible by a timer
normal form formula to Section 8 Theorem 27.
3. The future persistence timer is deﬁned from the future occurrence timer analogously to (1).
4. Metric elimination for timer formulas
4.1. Non-metrical approximations of timer formulas
Our main theorem associates with every timer normal form formula ϕ a metric-free formula ϕ
such that ϕ is satisﬁable (or valid) in R+ with its natural metric iff ϕ is satisﬁable (respectively,
valid) in R with the metric ignored. We start the discussion associating with any timer formula
Timern(X1, . . . ,Xn, Y1, . . . , Yn) a (metric free) ﬁrst-orderMLO formula Timern(X1, . . . ,Xn, Y1, . . . , Yn)
which summarizes the main ﬁrst-order property of the timer. The main theorem will then prove
that anymodel of Timern(X1, . . . ,Xn, Y1, . . . , Yn) can be enriched by a non-standard t + 1 function for
which Timern(X1, . . . Xn, Y1, . . . , Yn) holds. This non-standard metric line is isomorphic to the stan-
dard metric line and from this the main theorem will follow by the general principle of preservation
of truth under isomorphism.
Let Timern(X1, . . . Xn, Y1, . . . , Yn) be a given timer formula. The pure monadic ﬁrst-order for-
mula Timern(X1, . . . ,Xn, Y1, . . . , Yn) associated with it is the conjunction of nine formulas: three
formulas T1–T3 listing the non-metrical requirements enabling Yi to be a timer, four formulas
P1–P4 listing the non-metrical properties that enable Yi to be a timer for Xi and two formu-
las C1–C2 listing the non-metrical properties by which the different timers conform with each
other.
1. (T1) For every i, Yi holds at zero:
∀t[∀s(t  s) −→ Yi(t)].
Zero has no name in our language, but “t = 0” is deﬁned by ∀s(t  s).
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2. (T2) Yi has ﬁnite variability:{
∀t(∃t1)>t(∀t2)<t1>t (Xi(t2)↔ Xi(t1))
}∧{
(∀t)>0(∃t1)<t(∀t2)<t>t1(Xi(t2)↔ Xi(t1))
}
.
3. (T3) The set of points where Yi holds is a closed set:
∀t
(
¬Yi(t)→
{∃s1∃s2(s1 < t < s2 ∧ (∀v)<s2>s1¬Yi(v))}
)
(because of axiom T1 we do not have to consider the case where t = 0).
4. (P1) If Yi holds at a point other than zero, then Xi has been true for a while just before that point:
∀t
[(
t /= 0 ∧ Yi(t)
)→(∃s)<t(∀v)<t>sXi(v)
]
.
5. (P2) If Xi does not hold at a point, then Yi does not hold for a while:
∀t
(
¬Xi(t)→∃s
[
t < s ∧ (∀r)<s>t¬Yi(r))
])
.
6. (P3) If Xi is true from some point c forever, then Yi will be true from some point forever.(∃t(∀s)>tXi(s)))→(∃t(∀s)>tYi(s)).
7. (P4) If Xi and Yi are true at a point b, then Yi stays true as long as Xi does
∀t
{(
Yi(t) ∧ Xi(t)
) −→ (∀s)>t
([
(∀v)<s>tXi(v)
]←→ [(∀v)<s>t Yi(v)]
)}
.
8. (C1) If at a point Yi holds and Yj does not hold, then Xj holds for a shorter interval in the past
than Xi
∀t[Yi(t) ∧ ¬Yj(t) −→ ∃s < t((∀v)<t>sXi(v) ∧ (∃v)<t>s¬Xj(v))]
(note that axiom P1 gets close to be a special case of C1).
9. (C2) Conversely: if Xi holds for a longer interval in the past than Xj then Yi will be triggered
before Yj:
∀t(∀s)>t
[
(∀v)<t>s(Xi(v) ∧ ¬Yi(v)) ∧ (∃v)<t>s¬Xj(v)) −→ ¬Yj(t)
]
.
Deﬁnition 6.
1. For every n, Timern is the pure ﬁrst-orderMLO formula which is the conjunction of the formulae
1–9 above, for i, j  n.
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2. For every formula in timer normal form, ≡ ∃W (Timern(X1, . . . ,Xn, Y1, . . . , Yn) ∧ ϕ)wedenote
by  the non-metrical formula ∃W (Timern(X1, . . . ,Xn, Y1, . . . , Yn) ∧ ϕ).
Clearly if  is in timer normal form then every model of  is also a model of the non-metrical
formula  . Our main theorem proves that as far as satisﬁability is concerned they are equivalent.
Theorem 7 (Metric elimination theorem). Let  be in timer normal form,
 ≡ ∃W (Timern(X1, . . . ,Xn, Y1, . . . , Yn) ∧ ϕ), and let  be its non-metrical approximation:
 ≡ ∃W (Timern(X1, . . . ,Xn, Y1, . . . , Yn) ∧ ϕ).
Then,  is satisﬁable iff  is satisﬁable.
The theoremwill be proved in the next subsection.Note that since is obtained from effectively
we get an algorithm to check satisﬁability for formulas in timer normal form, provided satisﬁability
is decidable for the non-metrical formulas  which are obtained.
4.2. The proof of the metric elimination theorem
Let R+ be a model of  ≡ ∃W (Timern(X1, . . . ,Xn, Y1, . . . , Yn) ∧ ϕ). Thus there are sets P1, . . . , Pn,
Q1, . . . ,Qn such that R+ |= Timern(P1, . . . , Pn,Q1, . . . ,Qn) ∧ ϕ′ (we start to use the more conve-
nient notation of the fact that the sets P1, . . . , Pn,Q1, . . . ,Qn satisfy  . Also, writing ϕ′ we sup-
press the names of the sets that occur in ϕ′). We will construct an order preserving bijection
T : R+ −→ R+ such thatR+ |= Timern(T(P1), . . . , T(Pn), T(Q1), . . . , T(Qn)) ∧ ϕ′′, whereϕ′′ is obtained
from ϕ′ by replacing each parameter set A by its image T(A). In fact all that we must show is
that R+ |= Timern(T(P1), . . . , T(Pn), T(Q1), . . . , T(Qn)). The fact that ϕ′′ also holds is a well known,
easily checkable fact about monotone bijections (isomorphisms in MLO). So we assume that
R+ |= Timern(P1, . . . , Pn,Q1, . . . ,Qn) . We will construct unbounded increasing sequences of points
b1, b2, b3, . . ., and d1, d2, d3, . . ., and an increasing sequence of monotone bijections T1, T2, T3, . . ., with
Ti : [0, bi] −→ [0, di], and deﬁne T to be the union of these functions. The bounded approximations
Tk of T will be deﬁned in a way that will assure that:
R+ |= Timern(T(P1), . . . , T(Pn), T(Q1), . . . , T(Qn)).
Assume that Y has the timer properties with respect to X , as speciﬁed in the list above. Assume
that Y does not hold at a point t, but that it holds sometimes in the future. The largest lower bound
for the set of points in the future that satisfy Y is itself a point that satisﬁes Y by the closedness
property (T3). Hence there is a ﬁrst point in the future where Y holds. Such a point b will be called
a triggering point of Q. By the main property (P1) in the list, X holds for a while before b. The
maximal interval where X holds until it triggers Y will be called a triggering interval for Q. Clearly
these are the intervals that must have length 1 in our metrization. On the other hand we must make
sure that every non-triggering interval, where X holds without causing Y to hold, must have length
less than 1. This is all that we are after. Now any point belongs to only ﬁnitely many triggering and
non-triggering intervals, for different pairs of X and Y , and the different triggering and non-trig-
gering intervals do not conﬂict with each other by the axioms (C1) and (C2). This will enable us to
deal with one triggering interval at a time, declare its length 1, and deﬁne the length of all nearby
non-triggering intervals to have shorter length.
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First the deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 8. Let R+ |= Timern(P1, . . . , Pn,Q1, . . . ,Qn).
1. A triggering interval for Qi is a non-empty interval (a, b) with the following properties:
• Pi ∧ ¬Qi holds for any point in the (open) interval (a, b).
• Qi(b).
• a is the smallest point with this property, i.e., ∀t1 < a(∃t)<a>t1¬Pi(t).
The point b is a triggering point for Qi and the point a is an initializing point for Qi .
2. A non-triggering interval for Qi is an interval (a, b) with the following properties:
• Pi holds continuously in the interval (a, b) but not in any larger open interval that contains
(a, b).
• Qi does not hold at b.
The main properties of these intervals are summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 9 (The main properties of triggering intervals).
1. Every open interval that satisﬁes continuously Pi ∧ ¬Qi is contained in a unique triggering interval
forQi or in a unique non-triggering interval (triggering, ifQi is activated before, or just as, Pi ceases
to hold).
2. Every bounded interval contains at most ﬁnitely many triggering and initializing points.
3. The initializing points form a ﬁnite sequence or an inﬁnite sequence that diverges to inﬁnity.
4. For any point a there are at most n (the number of timers) non-triggering intervals that
contain a.
Proof.
1. Let (a, b) be such an interval and let (a′, b′) be a maximal open interval containing (a, b)
where Pi ∧ ¬Qi holds (i.e., the union of such open intervals containing (a, b)). By axiom
P3 b′ is not ∞. If Qi holds at b′ this is a triggering interval. Else it is a non-triggering
interval.
2. In a given interval there are only ﬁnitelymany triggering points forQi because of ﬁnite variability
(axiom T2), since every triggering point is a point where Qi changes its value. Every initializing
point corresponds to a unique triggering point by axioms C1 and C2. Therefore there are only
ﬁnitely many initializing points.
3. This follows immediately from the fact that every bounded interval contains only ﬁnitely many
elements of the sequence.
4. Two triggering intervals for a single Pi cannot overlap since their union would testify that they
are not maximal. 
We are now ready for the proof of the main lemma:
Lemma 10 (Isomorphism lemma). Let R+ |= Timern(P1, . . . , Pn,Q1, . . . ,Qn).
There is a monotone bijection T from R+ onto R+ such that:
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• If (a,b) is a triggering interval for some Qi, then
T(b) = T(a)+ 1.
• If (a,b) is a non-triggering interval for some Qi, then T(b) < T(a)+ 1.
Proof.Leta1, a2, . . . , be the increasing sequenceof initializingpoints, and for everyn letbn > an be the
triggering point that corresponds to an. We assume ﬁrst that this sequence is inﬁnite and by lemma
9(3) it diverges to∞ (later we shall deal with the case that there are only ﬁnitely many triggering
intervals). We deﬁne inductively a bijection Tn : [0, bn] → [0, dn] with the following properties:
1. {dn : n ∈ Nat} is an unbounded increasing sequence and Tn+1 extends Tn.
2. Tn is monotone.
3. Tn respects triggering intervals: if (a, b) is a triggering interval with b  bn (so that a = ai and
b = bi for some i  n) then Tn(b) = Tn(a)+ 1.
4. Tn respects non-triggering intervals: if (a, b) is a non-triggering interval with b  bn then Tn(b) <
Tn(a)+ 1.
We start with [0, b1]. There are two cases to consider: a1 = 0 and a1 /= 0.
Case 1. a1 = 0: this means that some Pi holds on (0, b1) and b1 is the ﬁrst point, apart from 0,
where Qi holds (note that by axiom T1 and P4 Pi does not hold at 0). We choose d1 to be 1 and map
[0, b1] by an arbitrary monotone function T1 onto [0, 1]. This T1 has all the properties required: every
triggering interval which is contained in [0, b1] is equal to [0, b1] so that the third property is satisﬁed
vacuously. On the other hand every proper subinterval is transformed into a proper subinterval of
[0, 1], so that the forth property holds.
Case 2. 0 < a1: we choose some c < 1 and map [0, a1] monotonically onto [0, c]. By Lemma 9
there are at most n non-triggering intervals that contain the point a1 and by axioms C1 and C2 they
all terminate before b1. Let e < b1 be larger than all the right endpoints of non-triggering intervals
that contain a1. We map T1(e) = 1 and extend the map monotonously from [a1, e] onto [c, 1] and
then also from [e, b1] onto [1, 1+ c]. By this choice non-triggering intervals that start before a1 are
mapped into intervals shorter than 1 by the choice of e whether they terminate before a1 or contain
a1. Non-triggering intervals that start after a1 and terminate before b1 are shorter than [a1, b1]which
is exactly 1. On the other hand [a1, b1] is the only triggering interval contained in [0, b1] and it is
mapped onto an interval of length one.
We turn now to the inductive step. We assume that Tn is deﬁned from [0, bn] onto [0, dn], and that
Tn(an) = d ′ = dn − 1. Remember that we assume that there is a next triggering point an+1. There are
again two cases to consider: an+1  bn and an+1 > bn.
Case1.an+1  bn: sincean < an+1  bn,wehaveTn(an+1) = d ′ + cwith c  1.WedeﬁneTn+1(bn+1)
= dn + c = dn+1. It remains to map [bn, bn+1]monotonously onto [dn, dn + c] in a way that will pre-
serve condition 4 for non-triggering intervals that end before bn+1 and after bn (intervals ending
before bn are taken care of by the induction assumption). If such an interval begins after an+1 then
monotonicitywill assure that its image is smaller than (dn + c)− (d ′ + c) = 1. Thuswe are interested
only in the ﬁnitely many non-triggering intervals that contain an+1 and bn. We may choose points
e1 and e2 such that an < e1 < an+1 < bn < e2 < bn+1 so that all the non-triggering intervals that
contain an+1 and bn are contained in, and are shorter than, [e1, e2]. Now Tn(e1) = d ′ + c′ with c′ < c.
We deﬁne next Tn+1(e2) = dn + c′. We conclude by extending Tn+1 monotonously from [bn, e2] onto
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[dn, dn + c′] and from [e2, bn+1] onto [dn + c′, dn + c]. It follows from the choice of e1 and e2 that
condition 4 remains true for Tn+1.
Case 2. bn < an+1: let e1 < e2 be two points between an and bn such that all the non-triggering
intervals that contain bn start beyond e2. Tn(e1) = Tn(an)+ c1 and Tn(e2) = Tn(an)+ c2. We deﬁne
Tn+1(an+1) = dn + c1 and extend T monotonously from [bn, an+1] onto [dn, dn + c1]. Non-triggering
intervals that terminate before an+1 remain small. Next we choose a point e3 between an+1 and bn+1
which lies beyond the non-triggering intervals that contain an+1 and we deﬁne Tn+1(e3) = dn + c2.
It remains to extend monotonously Tn+1 from [an+1, e3] to [dn + c1, dn + c2] and from [e3, bn+1] to
[dn + c2, dn + c1 + 1].
This completes the inductive proof and in the limit we obtain a mapping T that satisﬁes re-
quirements 2–4. To show that the sequence dn is unbounded we pick a subsequence ain of the
initializing points with the property that bin < ain+1 . It follows by monotonicity that din+1 − din >
T(bin+1)− T(ain+1) = 1. This completes the proof when there are inﬁnitely many triggering inter-
vals.
It remains to deal with the case where there are only ﬁnitely many triggering intervals so that we
reach in the construction a state where Tn : [0, bn] → [0, dn] is deﬁned and there are no initializing
points beyond an. We choose points e1 and e2 such that an < e1 < bn < e2 and such that every
non-triggering interval that contains bn starts after e1 and ends before e2. Tn(e1) = Tn(an)+ c with
c < 1 and we deﬁne Tn+1(e2) = dn + c. We extend Tn+1 to map [bn, e2] onto [dn, dn + c]. Next we
choose bn+1 such that e2 < bn+1 and bn + 1 < bn+1. We map Tn+1(bn+1) = dn + 1 = dn+1 and extend
the mapping from [e2, bn+1] to [dn + c, dn+1]. The mapping satisﬁes the requirements and it extends
the domain and the range at least by one unit. This construction can be repeated by induction (with
the pairs bm−1, bm replacing an and bn of the previous case). This will yield a mapping T that is from
R+ onto R+. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
Next we show that with this isomorphism construction each Qi becomes a proper metric timer
for Pi:
Lemma 11. Each T(Qi) is a timer for T(Pi).
Proof.We must show:
(a) If t ∈ T(Pi) for all c < t < c + 1 then c + 1 ∈ T(Qi).
(b) If d ∈ T(Qi) then t ∈ T(Pi) for all d − 1 < t < d .
We must also check the case where the point under discussion is less than 1,
(c) If t ∈ T(Pi) for all t < c + 1 then c + 1 ∈ T(Qi).
(d) If d ∈ T(Qi) and d < 1 then t ∈ T(Pi) for 0  t < d .
(a) Assume that T(Pi) holds at an interval (c, d) with d = c + 1, c = T(a) and d = T(b) . Then Pi
holds at every point in the interval (a, b). IfQi holds at some point in the interval (a, b) then it holds
at b by axiom P4 and T3, and T(Qi) holds at d . So it remains to check the case that T(Qi) does
not hold at any point in (c, d), and Qi does not hold at any point in (a, b). Now (a, b) cannot be
contained in a non-triggering interval for Qi, as our construction assures that non-triggering inter-
vals are mapped onto intervals of length less than 1. By Lemma 9 (a, b) is therefore contained in a
triggering interval (a′, b′). Therefore (T(a′), T(b′)) has length 1 and contains (c, d) and Qi holds at b′
and T(Qi) holds at T(b′). By monotonicity (T(a′), T(b′)) contains (T(a), T(b)) and both have length 1,
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so that they coincide. Therefore d = T(b′) and T(Qi) holds at d . Hence T(Qi) holds whenever T(Pi)
has been holding for one unit of time.
(b+d) Assume that T(Qi) holds at a point d = T(b). By axiom T3 either b is a triggering point
for Qi or there is a triggering point a before b such that Qi holds at [a, b]. By axioms P2, Pi
holds on [a, b) and T(Pi) holds on [T(a), T(b)). By our construction a = 0 or Pi holds at (a− 1, a)
(or on [0, a)) and T(Pi) holds prior to d for at least one unit of time (or since the beginning of
time).
(c) Assume that T(Pi) holds on [0, d) and d = T(b). Then Pi holds on [0, b) and by axioms T1, T3,
and P4, Qi holds on b and T(Qi) holds on T(b).
The proof of the metric elimination theorem. We have now all the ingredients for the proof. Since
every model of  is a model of  it is obvious that if  is satisﬁable then so is also  . Assume on
the other hand that  is satisﬁed so that there are sets P1, . . . , Pn,Q1, . . . ,Qn (as well as some oth-
ers that we do not mention explicitly) such that R+ |= Timern(P1, . . . , Pn,Q1, . . . ,Qn) ∧ ϕ′ (we write
ϕ′ to acknowledge the sets that occur in ϕ′ as parameters). Next we use the isomorphism lemma
to construct a monotone bijection T for which R+ |= Timern(T(P1), . . . , T(Pn), T(Q1), . . . , T(Qn)), by
Lemma 10. ϕ on the other hand is a pure MLO formula and it is invariant under the order pre-
serving bijection so that R+ |= ϕ′′, where each set A in ϕ′ is replaced by T(A). It now follows that
R+ |= ∃W Timern(P1, . . . , Pn,Q1, . . . ,Qn) ∧ ϕ. This completes the proof of the metric elimination the-
orem. 
4.3. Decidability of timer normal form formulas
With the technical work behind us we obtain the decidability results from the corresponding
non-metric case:
Theorem 12 (Decidability for timer normal form).
1. The satisﬁability of a formula in ﬁrst-order timer normal form in the canonical model is decidable.
2. The satisﬁability of a formula in the second-order timer normal form under the ﬁnite variability
interpretation is decidable.
Proof. Given a formula ϕ in normal form then its non-metric approximation ϕ is computed algo-
rithmically. The satisﬁability of ϕ is decidable by Theorem 2 and it is equivalent to the satisﬁability
of ϕ by the metric elimination theorem. 
4.4. Discussion: the mathematical content of the metric elimination theorem
The construction of the bijection in the isomorphism lemma (Lemma 10) is the mathematical
backbone of the metric elimination procedure. It says that under some assumptions the metric of
R+ can be rescaled (via the bijection T ) in a way that all intervals in a chosen set of intervals will
have length 1 and all the intervals in another chosen set will have length less than 1. Our two sets of
intervals were very simple sets and it is obvious that we just touched upon a general mathematical
theorem:
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The next theorem gives the most general conditions for the existence of such a rescaling. The
conditions are about limits of sequences of intervals and the rescaling deﬁnes directly a new “+1"
function. We start with the deﬁnition of these notions.
Deﬁnition 13.
1. A function S : R+ −→ R+ is a successor function if
• S is monotone: x < y −→ S(x) < S(y),
• S(x) > x,
• S is continuous: if xn −→ x then S(xn) −→ S(x).
2. If S with these properties is deﬁned only on a closed subset ofR+ it will be called a partial successor
function.
3. An interval [a, b] is the limit of a sequence of intervals [an, bn]n∈N and the sequence of intervals
converges to [a, b] if the sequence 〈an〉n∈N converges to a and the sequence 〈bn〉n∈N converges
to b.
The next proposition justiﬁes our terminology
Proposition 14. A function S : R+→R+ is a successor function if and only if there exists an order
preserving bijection . : R+ −→ R+ such that ∀a ∈ R+..(S(a)) = .(a)+ 1, where + is the standard
addition of reals.
Proof. Assume that . : R+ −→ R+ is an order preserving bijection and that ∀a ∈ R+ · .(S(a)) =
.(a)+ 1. We will show that S is a successor function. Note that S = /a ∈ R+ · .−1(.(a)+ 1). First
observe that S is monotone since . preserves order. Second, .(S(a)) = .(a)+ 1 > .(a) and by order
preservation we derive S(a) > a. Finally, every order preserving bijection from the non-negative
reals to the non-negative reals is continuous (by Basic Set Theory or Calculus), and the+1 function
is continuous. Therefore S which is the composition of the order preserving bijection .−1 with +1
is continuous.
Assume for the opposite direction that S has the three properties. We construct an order pre-
serving bijection  for which (a+ 1) = S((a)). . is then the inverse of . By Basic Set Theory
(or calculus) there is an order preserving bijection  from [0, 1] onto [0, S(0)]. We extend  to a
bijection from [0, 2] onto [0, S(S(0))], deﬁning for every t between 0 and 1, (t + 1) = S((t)). Simi-
larly, we extend  to a bijection from [0, 3] onto [0, S(S(S(0)))], deﬁning for every t between 1 and 2,
(t + 1) = S((t)). Continuing in this manner and taking the union of the functions thus constructed
we obtain an order preserving bijection from the non-negative real line onto an open preﬁx of the
non-negative real line which satisﬁes (a+ 1) = S((a)). It remains to show that this preﬁx is all of
R+. Else the range  has a least upper bound b. Since b > S(0) there is a point c such that b = S(c).
c is not an upper bound for the range so that for some d , (d) > c. But then by the deﬁnition of ,
(d + 1) = S((d)) > S(c) = b. This contradicts the choice of b as an upper bound for the range. 
Theorem 15 (Rescaling theorem). Let  and  be sets of intervals. We call the intervals in  unit
intervals and the intervals in  small intervals. The following conditions together form a necessary and
sufﬁcient condition for the existence of a successor function S for which S(b)− S(a) = 1 if [a, b] ∈ 
and S(b)− S(a) < 1 if [a, b] ∈  :
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1. (Downward compatibility) The limit of a sequence of unit intervals is neither a single point nor is it
contained in a small interval (in particular no unit interval is contained in a small interval).
2. (Upward compatibility) The limit of intervals in  ∪  does not properly contain a limit of unit
intervals. In particular no unit interval properly contains another unit interval.
3. (Boundedness)Let [an, bn]n∈N be a sequence of intervals in ∪ . If the sequence 〈an〉n∈N is bounded
then the sequence 〈bn〉n∈N is bounded.
These conditions are clearly necessary: (1) and (2) are obvious size compatibility conditions, (3) is
necessary if R+ is to have inﬁnite length (note that we do not exclude the possibility that a unit
interval will be the limit of small intervals). The proof that these conditions are also sufﬁcient is
given in the appendix.
Lemma 10 is a special case of Theorem 15.
4.5. The rational time line
When trying to apply the metric elimination procedure in the case of the rational time line Q+
we face two major differences. On the one hand even the axioms 1–9 are no longer expressible in
ﬁrst-order MLO. In fact an interval of rational numbers that has non-rational endpoints cannot
be described in ﬁrst-orderMLO. On the other hand, even second-orderMLO is decidable over the
rational time line (Theorem 2). This is very lucky since the axioms 1–9 can be easily expressed in
second-orderMLO. Thus ∀x, y , z(x < y < z ∧ x ∈ X ∧ z ∈ X −→ y ∈ X) says that X is an interval,
and this is used expressing the axioms. With this modiﬁcation we obtain via a similar proof an even
stronger decidability theorem for the rational time line:
Theorem 16. The satisﬁability of a formula of second-order timer normal form is decidable over the
rational line Q+.
5. Temporal logics
Temporal logics evolved inphilosophical logic andwere enthusiastically embracedbya largebody
ofcomputer scientists.Temporal logicsuse logical constructs called“modalities” tocreatea language
that is free fromvariables andquantiﬁers. Everymodality thatwas seriously considered corresponds
to a formula in relational logic, and it is obvious that temporal logic can be thought of as syntactical
sugar for a fragment of classical logic. In its purest form the use of sugaring is harmless since Kamp
proved that the expressive power of the temporal logic based on the modalities “until” and “since”
equals that of the monadic logic of order (concerning formulas with at most one free variable).
Here is the general logical framework to deﬁne temporal logics:
The syntax of the temporal logic TL(O(k1)1 · · ·O(kn)n ) has in its vocabulary monadic predicate vari-
ables X1,X2, . . . and a sequence of modality names with prescribed arity, O
(k1)
1 · · ·O(kn)n (the arity
notation is usually omitted). The formulas of this temporal logic are given by the grammar:
ϕ ::= X |¬ϕ|ϕ ∧ ϕ|O(k)(ϕ1, . . . ,ϕk).
When the particular modality names are unimportant or they are clear from the context we omit
them and write TL instead of TL(O(k1)1 , . . . ,O
(kn)
n ).
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Structures for TL are again linear orders with monadic predicates M = 〈A,<, P1, P2, . . . , Pn, . . .〉,
where predicate Pi is assigned to a variable Xi . Every modality O(k) is interpreted in every struc-
tureM as an operator O(k)M : [(A)]k → (A) which assigns “the set of points where O(k)[S1, . . . , Sk ]
holds” to the k-tuple 〈S1, . . . , Sk〉 ∈ (A)k . (Here  is the power set notation, and (A) denotes the
set of all subsets of A.) Once every modality corresponds to an operator the semantics is deﬁned by
structural induction:
• for atomic formulae
〈M , 〉 |=
T
X iff  ∈ P , where the monadic predicate P is assigned to X ,
• for Boolean combinations the deﬁnition is the usual one,
• for O(k)(ϕ1, . . . ,ϕk)
〈M , 〉 |=
T
O(k)(ϕ1, . . . ,ϕk) iff  ∈ O(k)M (Aϕ1 , . . . ,Aϕk ),
where Aϕ = { : 〈M , 〉 |=
T
ϕ} (we suppressed predicate parameters that may occur in the formu-
las).
Actually we are interested in amore restricted case; for themodality to be of interest the operator
O(k) should reﬂect some intended connection between the sets Aϕi of points satisfying ϕi and the
set of points O[Aϕ1 , . . . ,Aϕk ]. The intended meaning is usually given by a formula in an appropriate
predicate logic:
Truth tables: a formula O(t0,X1, . . . ,Xk) in the predicate logic L is a truth table for the modality
O(k) if for every structure M
OM(P1, . . . , Pk) = { : M |=
MLO
O[, P1, . . . , Pk ]}.
The following are examples of modalities introduced through truth tables. The modalities until
and since which are introduced here are the most commonly chosen modalities in temporal logic
for computer science.
Example 1 (Tables for modalities).
• The modality ♦X , “eventually X ,” is deﬁned by
ϕ(t0,X) ≡ ∃t > t0X(t).
• The modality←−♦X , “X has happened before,” is deﬁned by ϕ(t0,X) ≡ ∃t < t0 X(t).
• The modality X U Y , “X until Y ,” is deﬁned by
ϕ(t0,X , Y) ≡ ∃t1(t0 < t1 ∧ Y(t1) ∧ ∀t(t0 < t < t1 → X(t))).
• The modality X S Y , “X since Y ,” is deﬁned by
ϕ(t0,X , Y) ≡ ∃t1(t0 > t1 ∧ Y(t1) ∧ ∀t(t1 < t < t0 → X(t))).
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• Always (X) is the modality that states that X always holds. Its truth table is:
ϕ(t0,X) ≡ (t0 = t0) ∧ ∀t. X(t).
The following observation justiﬁes our view that temporal logic can be thought of as an alterna-
tive approach (sugaring) to fragments of the predicate logic in which they are deﬁned:
Proposition 17. If every modality in a temporal logic TL has a truth table in the logicMLO then for ev-
ery formula ϕ(X1, . . . ,Xn)ofTLthere corresponds effectively (andnaturally)a formula ϕ(t0,X1, . . . ,Xn)
of MLO such that for every M ,  ∈ M and predicates P1, . . . , Pn
〈M , , P1, . . . , Pn〉 |=
T
ϕ iff 〈M , , P1, . . . , Pn〉 |=
MLO
ϕ .
In particular by Example 1, the temporal logic TL( U, S) with the modalities “until” and “since”
describes a fragment of (ﬁrst-order)MLO.
5.1. Expressive completeness of TL(until, since)
The discussion above brings up the question as to which simple collection of truth tables and
modalities sufﬁces to represent all of the monadic logic. Formally:
Deﬁnition 18 (Expressive completeness). Let L be a fragment of ﬁrst-order logic and let C be a
class of structures. A temporal logic TL′ is expressively complete for L over C if for every formula
 (t0,X1, . . . ,Xn) ∈ L with a single free ﬁrst-order variable t0, there is a formula ϕ ∈ TL′ which is
equivalent to  over C , and for every formula ϕ ∈ TL′, there is a formula  (t0,X1, . . . ,Xn) ∈ L with
a single free ﬁrst-order variable x0 which is equivalent to ϕ over C .
We could of course take all the formulas with one free variable ofMLO as truth tables for mo-
dalities. This would yield an expressively complete, extremely uninteresting temporal logic. A much
smaller collection of modalities sufﬁces, as can be seen from the following beautiful theorem:
Theorem 19.
1. ([14], reproved in [8]) : the temporal logic TL(until, since) is expressively complete for (ﬁrst-order)
MLO over the two canonical structures: the real line and the natural numbers.
2. [7] There is a pair of modalities X until sY and X since sY (“Stavi’s modalities") which together
with the since and until is expressively complete for (ﬁrst-order)MLOover the class of all linear
orders.
Hence from now on when we say simply “temporal logic” or “pure temporal logic” we mean
TL(until, since).
6. Quantitative temporal logic (QTL) and quantitative monadic logic of order (QMLO)
We already indicated in our discussion of the Timer formulas what seems to us themost econom-
ical of metric notions that should be introduced into the discussion: there is the notion of distance in
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the background andwewant to be able to say thatwithin one unit of time in the past (or in the future)
such and such happened (or will happen). This leads to the predicate logic QMLO—quantitative
monadic logic of order, and QTL—quantitative temporal logic of order.
Deﬁnition 20 (Quantitative temporal logic—QTL). For any set of temporal modalities  which is
expressively complete for the ﬁrst-order monadic logic of order we denote byQTL() the temporal
logic constructed from  and two newmodalities♦1X and←−♦ 1X deﬁned by the tables with t0 free:
♦1X : ∃t((t0 < t < t0 + 1) ∧ X(t)), (1)
←−♦ 1X : ∃t((t < t0 < t + 1) ∧ X(t)). (2)
We shall denote by QTL the quantitative logic QTL(U, S).
Remark 21. The reader may suspect that since TL(U, S) is expressively complete it would sufﬁce
to add the new modalities only to this basic temporal logic. While this is true in view of the next
theorem, it cannot be assumed a priori; the expressive power of two equivalent logics may differ
after adding the same construct to both.
We also introduce the derived modalities:
1X = ¬♦1¬X , (3)
←− 1X = ¬←−♦ 1¬X. (4)
Next we intend to identify the fragment ofMLO
+
that corresponds to QTL. This fragment will
use the function t + 1 only in a very restricted form as indicated in (1) and (2).We recall our notation
of bounded quantiﬁers: (∃t)<t0+1>t0 and (∃t)<t0>t0−1 are shorthand for the following: if ϕ is a formula of
MLO
+
then
(∃t)<t0+1>t0 ϕ ≡ ∃t(t0 < t < t0 + 1 ∧ ϕ(t)), (5)
(∃t)<t0>t0−1ϕ ≡ ∃t((t < t0 < t + 1) ∧ ϕ(t)). (6)
Deﬁnition 22 (Quantitative monadic logic of order—QMLO). QMLO is the fragment of MLO
+
which is built from the atomic formulas t1 < t2, t1 = t2,X(t) (t, t1, t2 variables) using Boolean con-
nectives, ﬁrst-order quantiﬁers, and the following rule: if ϕ(t) is a formula of QMLO with t its only
ﬁrst-order free variable then (∃t)<t0+1>t0 ϕ and (∃t)<t0>t0−1ϕ are formulas of QMLO.
Remark 23.The reader should not take lightly the restricting feature that t is to be the only free vari-
able inϕ. Relaxing this requirement yields non-decidable logics and our subsequent quite non-trivial
research deals with careful modiﬁcations that give rise to stronger yet decidable logics [13].
Since the new modalities of QTL have truth tables in QMLO it is clear that QTL corresponds to a
fragment of QMLO. The following observation shows that it is complete:
Theorem 24 (Expressively completeness of QTL in QMLO). Let  be any expressive complete set of
modalities (over the reals) for ﬁrst-order MLO.
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For every formula p over the modalities {,♦1,←−♦ 1} there is a formula ϕ(t0) of QMLO effectively
computable from p such that ϕ(t0) is equivalent (over the reals) to p.
For every formula ϕ(t0) of QMLO (with no variable except t0 free) there is a formula p over the
modalities {,♦1,←−♦ 1} effectively computable from ϕ(t0) such that ϕ(t0) is equivalent (over the reals)
to p. In particular QTL is expressibly complete for QMLO.
Proof. The ﬁrst claim is similar to Proposition 17. Once the modalities have truth tables in some
predicate logic the translation of every formula follows by an easy induction.
The second claim is proved by induction on the total number of bounded quantiﬁers in the
QMLO formula ϕ(t0). If there are none then ϕ(t0) is equivalent to some TL() formula since  is
expressively complete. Otherwise we eliminate some innermost occurrence of a bounded quantiﬁer
in ϕ: assume (∃t)<t1+1>t1 5(t) is a subformula of ϕ with 5 in pure monadic logic. Note that t1 maybe
t0 and that t is the only variable free in 5. Therefore, there is some formula  (t0,X) that has one
more predicate variable X and one bounded quantiﬁer fewer than ϕ(t0) such that ϕ is obtained
from (t0,X) by substituting (∃t)<t1+1>t1 5(t) for X(t1). By assumption there is a TL() formula 51 which
describes in every model the same predicate as 5(t) and therefore 151 describes the same predicate
as (∃t)<t1+1>t1 5(t). By the induction assumption there is a QTL formula  1(X) which is equivalent to
 (t0,X). It is now clear that  1(151) describes in every model the same set as ϕ(t0). 
Note that the theorem proves that the addition of the new metric modalities to any complete
set  of modalities yields the fragment of QMLO. Hence there is no loss of generality by choosing
from now on  = { U, S}.
7. The expressive power of QMLO (and QTL)
The two modest modalities ←−♦ 1 and ♦1 when added to the until and the since connectives are
quite strong in expressive power. They are capable of expressing modalities concerning intervals
other than the open unit interval and they may be used to express all of the operators which we
found in the literature for real time logic. In view of the expressive completeness theorem we can
phrase the expressibility results in terms of the temporal logic QTL or in terms of the predicate
logic QMLO.
7.1. General bounded quantiﬁers
The modalities←−♦ 1 and♦1 refer to the existence of a witness in the next or in the previous (open)
unit of time. More general modalities can be deﬁned from these two. In fact any open, closed or
half open, bounded or unbounded interval can be the domain of a deﬁnable operator.
Notations like (∃t)<t0+n+m>t0+n , (∃t)t0+n+mt0+n , and (∃t)<∞>t0+n are self explanatory. Here are formulas of
QMLO that deﬁne more general bounded quantiﬁers from the basic bounded quantiﬁer (∃t)<t0+1>t0 :
(a) (∃t)<t0+1t0 X(t) ≡ X(t0) ∨ (∃t)<t0+1>t0 X(t),
(b) (∃t)t0+1>t0 X(t) ≡ (∃t)<t0+1>t0 X(t) ∨ [First (t0,X) ∧ (∀t1)<t0+1>t0 (∃t)<t1+1>t1 X(t)],
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where First(t0,X) says that there is a ﬁrst point past t0 for which X(t) holds:
First(t0,X) ≡ ∃t1[t0 < t1 ∧ X(t1) ∧ ∀t(t0 < t < t1 → ¬X(t))] (7)
(Clearly when X(t) has a ﬁrst point in the future then the last conjunct in (b) is equivalent to
X(t0 + 1).)
(c) (∃t)<∞>t0+1X(t) ≡ (∀t)t0+1>t0 ∃t1.t1 > t ∧ X(t1),
(d) (∀t)<t0+n+1>t0+n X(t) ≡ (∀t)<t0+n>t0+n−1(∃t2)<t+1>t (∀t1)
<t2+1
>t2
X(t1) for n > 0.
This can be summarized:
Theorem 25. The extension L of QMLO by the following rules is expressively equivalent to QMLO
over the canonical model.
if ϕ(t) is an L formula with the only free variable t then the following are L formulae:
1. (∃t)<t0+n+m>t0+n ϕ(t), where n is an integer and m a positive natural number.
2. (∃t > t0 + n)ϕ(t) (denoted also by (∃t)<∞>t0+nϕ(t)) and (∃t < t0 + n)ϕ(t) (denoted by (∃t)<t0+n>−∞ ϕ(t)),
where n is an integer.
3.Similar to (1) or (2) above with weak inequality replacing one or both occurrences of the strong
inequality.
Henceforth, we will freely use these generalized quantiﬁers which are deﬁnable in QMLO and also
the corresponding modalities like [n,m]X which is deﬁned by (∃t)t0+mt0+n X(t), and similarly [n,m]X .
In this new notation ♦1X = (0,1)X and←−♦ 1X = (−1,0)X .
7.2. Modalities in real time logics
We deﬁne in QMLO the main metric modalities that were previously proposed:
1. In [15] the main metric modalities used are of the form (X) > n where n is a natural number
and similar modalities with the inequality reversed and with the inequalities replaced by weak
inequalities. The meaning of (X) > n is that X was true for the last n units of time. (X) = n
means that X started exactly n units ago and was true from then until now. In QMLO this
translates to:
[(X) > n] ≡ (∀t)<t0>t0−nX(t),
[(X) = n] ≡ (∀t)<t0>t0−nX(t) ∧ ((∀t)<t0−n+1>t0−n )(∃s)<t>t−1¬X(s).
Thus the modalities of Manna, Pnueli are deﬁnable in QMLO and QTL.
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2. Wilke [21] introduced a relative distance construct “the ﬁrst time X(t) occurs after t0 is in dis-
tance smaller than, larger than or equal to n”. Speciﬁcally, Wilke uses a parameterized predicate
formula d(X , t) ∼ n which can be interpreted as a family of truth tables for modalities. These
modalities depend on the choice of the distance n and on the choice between equality or kind of
inequality. In QMLO these modalities can be deﬁned by:
d<n(X) ≡ First(t0,X) ∧ (∃t)<t0+n>t0 X(t),
d=n(X) ≡ (∃t)t0+n>t0 X(t) ∧ (∀t)<t0+n>t0 ¬X(t).
3. The popular logicMITL [1–4, 9] is based on an inﬁnite set of modalities untilI where I is a non-
singular interval with integer endpoints—thesemodalities are called constrained untilmodalities.
In one of the different variants of this operator Xuntil I Y means that there is t in the interval
I such that in t units of time Y will hold and until then X holds (see also [10] for a different
meaning). The constrained until modalities are easily expressible in QTL:
(a) X U(0,m)Y is equivalent to X UY ∧ ♦(0,m)Y ,
(b) X U[0,m)Y is equivalent to Y ∨ X U(0,m)Y ,
(c) for n > 0
X U(n,n+m)Y is equivalent to 1X ∧ ♦1(0,n)(X ∧ X UY) ∧ ♦(n,n+m)Y ,
i.e.: X and X UY hold from the current point t until a point after t + n. The last clause
assures that the Y that makes X UY true does not occur after the interval (t + n, t + n+ m),
(d) for n > 0
X U[n,n+m)Y is equivalent to X U(n,n+m)Y ∨ ((0,n)X ∧ ♦[n,n+1)(Y ∧ (−1,0)X)),
i.e.: either X holds up to a point in (t + n, t + n+ m) where Y holds, or X holds up to t + n
and Y holds at t + n. This last case is covered by the existence of a t1 in [t + n, t + n+ 1)
where Y holds and where X has been true for the last unit of time.
The following modiﬁcations take care of the case when the intervals are closed on the right.
(e) X U(0,m]Y is equivalent to X UY ∧ ♦(0,m]Y ,
(f) X U[0,m]Y is equivalent to Y ∨ X U(0,m]Y ,
(g) for n > 0,
X U(n,n+m]Y is equivalent to 1X ∧ ♦1(0,n)(X ∧ X UY) ∧ ♦(n,n+m]Y ,
(h) for n > 0
X U[n,n+m]Y is equivalent to X U(n,n+m]Y ∨ ((0,n)X ∧ ♦[n,n+1)(Y ∧ (−1,0)X)).
Hence, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 26.MITL and QTL are expressively equivalent.
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4. In [10] a modality  is deﬁned as  (n,n+m)X—the ﬁrst instance of X(t) in the future lies in the interval
(t0 + n, t0 + n+ m). This is deﬁned in QMLO by:
 (n,n+m)X ≡ First(t0,X) ∧ (∃t)<t0+n+m>t0+n X(t) ∧ ¬(∃t)t0+n>t0 X(t).
7.3. Modalities with rational interval
Clearly we cannot express “P will happen within the next half unit of time,” using only mo-
dalities U, S, ♦1, and ←−♦ 1. Therefore the extension of QTL by the inﬁnite set of modalities {♦r :
r is rational} ∪ {←−♦ r : r is rational} strengthens the expressive power of the language (♦ 1
n
P is inter-
preted as “P will happen within the next 1n fraction of unit of time").
Not surprisingly however as far as satisﬁability is concerned there is a simple reduction of this
extension to the QTL as follows: assume that r1, . . . , rn are all the rationals that are mentioned
in a formula 7. Let r be a common deviser of r1, . . . , rn, so there are integers d1, . . . , dn such that
ri = di × r for i = 1, . . . , n. Therefore all the modalities of the formula are of the form ♦di×r or of
the form←−♦ di×r . Let 7′ be the formula where each di × r is replaced by di . Then, every model of 7
can be made into a model of 7′ by a simple rescaling, and vice versa. Hence 7 and 7′ are equivalent
as far as satisﬁability is concerned. Moreover, by the result of Section 7.1, 7′ is equivalent to aQTL
formula and therefore its satisﬁability is decidable (by Corollary 29 below).
In [1] modalities of the form UI and SI are considered where I is an interval with rational
(not necessary integer) endpoints. The transformations similar to those in Section 7.2 can show
that this logic has the same expressive power as the extension of QTL mentioned above and as
TL( U, S, {♦ 1
n
: n ∈ Nat} ∪ {←−♦ 1
n
: n ∈ Nat}).
If we allow a modality ♦8, where 8 is irrational then the decidability question becomes more
intriguing from mathematical point of view, but it may loose its appeal to the working computer
scientist.
8. Decidability ofQMLO andQTL
Theorem 28 will show that every QMLO formula is equivalent to a formula in timer normal
form. We shall show ﬁrst that ♦1X is expressible by a formula in timer normal form. Note that the
formula ♦1X is not expressible by a formula in TL (until, since,←−♦ 1); the existential quantiﬁcation
over sets is essential in expressing ♦1X by a formula in timer normal form.
Theorem 27 (Reducing the future to the past). ♦1X is equivalent to a formula in timer normal form.
Proof. First observe that if
Always(Y↔♦1X)
then
1. if Y holds at t then Y holds until the next occurrence of X ,
2. if X holds at t then Y was true for the previous unit of time, and
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3. if X was false for a unit interval of time then Y was false at the beginning of the interval (hence
somewhere in the interval).
Hence, Always(Y↔♦1X) implies the following formula  
 ≡ Always(Y→Y until X) ∧ Always(X→←− 1Y) ∧ Always((←− 1¬X)→←−♦ 1¬Y).
Moreover, the ﬁrst and the third conjuncts in  imply that Y→♦1X ; the second conjunct implies
♦1X→Y .
Therefore,  is equivalent to Always(Y↔♦1X). Hence,
♦1X is equivalent to ∃Y(Y ∧  ).
Therefore, it remains to show that  is equivalent to a formula in timer normal form.
Note that all metrical modalities in  are past modalities. We construct the timer normal form
for  in two steps.
First we get rid of weak order in←−♦ 1¬Y . Similar to Eq. (b) of Section 7.1 we have that←−♦ 1¬Y
is equivalent to←−♦ 1¬Y ∨ (last(¬Y) ∧←− 1←−♦ 1¬Y), where the modality last(Z) holds at t iff there is a
last occurrence of Z before t (it can be expressed as ¬ZsinceZ). Hence,  is equivalent to
Always(Y→Y untilX)∧Always(X→←− 1Y)∧Always((←− 1¬X)→(←−♦ 1¬Y ∨ (last(¬Y)∧←− 1←−♦ 1¬Y))).
Using the law←−♦ 1Z ↔ ¬←− 1¬Z we can rewrite the last formula as
Always(Y→Y untilX)∧Always(X→←− 1Y)∧Always((←− 1¬X)→(¬←− 1Y ∨(last(¬Y)∧←− 1¬←− 1Y))).
Finally, introducing a timer for every subformula that starts with←− 1 we can easily see that  is
equivalent to the following formula in timer normal form:
∃T1T2T3.Timer(¬X , T1) ∧ Timer(Y , T2) ∧ Timer(¬T2, T3)∧
∧ Always(Y→Y untilX ) ∧ Always(X→T2) ∧ Always(T1→(¬T2 ∨ (last(¬Y ) ∧ T3)).
(Here Timer(¬Z ,W) stands for ∃Z ′.Timer(Z ′,W) ∧ Always(Z ′↔¬Z).) 
The decidability of QMLO (and hence of QTL) is proved by reduction to timer normal form.
Theorem 28 (Reduction to timer normal form). There is an algorithm which associates with any
formula ϕ(t¯,Z) of QMLO variables X1, . . . ,Xn, Y1, . . . , Yn and a formula ϕ(t¯,X1, . . . ,Xn, Y1, . . . , Yn,Z)
of pure MLO such that ϕ(t¯,Z) is equivalent to the formula:
∃X ∃Y (Timern(X1, . . . ,Xn, Y1, . . . , Yn) ∧ ϕ(t¯,X , Y ,Z)).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of metric quantiﬁers in ϕ. If there are none then ϕ
is already in pureMLO form. Else we may focus on an innermost metric quantiﬁer and we assume
for simplicity that it is of the form (∀t)<t1>t1−15(t,Z) so that there is some formula  (t¯,Z , Y)) that has
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one more predicate variable Y and one bonded quantiﬁer fewer than ϕ such that ϕ is obtained from
 (t¯, Z , Y) by substituting (∀t)<t1>t1−15(t,Z) for Y(t1). It is clear that ϕ is equivalent to
∃YX( ∧ Timer(X , Y) ∧ ∀t.X(t)↔5(t,Z)),
whereX is a fresh variable. By the inductive assumption has a timer normal form . I.e, (t¯,Z , Y) is
equivalent to the formula: ∃X ∃Y (Timern(X1, . . . ,Xn, Y1, . . . , Yn) ∧  (t¯,X , Y ,Z , Y)).Hence ϕ is equiv-
alent to the following formula in timer normal form ∃X ∃Y ∃Y ∃X(Timern(X1, . . . ,Xn, Y1, . . . , Yn) ∧
Timer(X , Y) ∧  ∧ ∀t.X(t)↔5(t)). If the innermost simple metric formula that we chose starts with
a future quantiﬁer it is dealt with similarly using Theorem 27. 
Thus from the decidability theorem for timer normal form we get:
Corollary 29.
1. Satisﬁability in the canonical model is decidable for QMLO and for QTL.
2. Satisﬁability in the ﬁnite variability canonical model is decidable for QMLO and for QTL.
Note that the theorem proves for the ﬁrst time decidability for the model with unrestricted
variability and gives a simple automata-free proof for the ﬁnite variability model.
9. The complexity ofQTL
In this section we show that our general approach yields quite straightforwardly the expected
complexity bounds formetric temporal logic, without appealing to automata theoretical techniques.
We provide a polynomial time reduction from QTL to TL( U, S) which preserves satisﬁability.
We then apply Theorem 34 from [18] and Theorem 35 due to Reynolds [19] which state that the
satisﬁability problem of TL( U, S) is PSPACE complete both for the canonical model and for the
ﬁnite variability canonical model. These theorems were proved without appealing to automata
theory.
We start with the observation that the formula Timer of the predicate logic (see Section 5) is
expressible in Temporal Logic, by a simple formula:
Lemma 30. There is a QTL formula timern(X1, . . . ,Xn, Y1, . . . , Yn) of size O(n2) over the modalities
Until and Since such that Timern(X1, . . . ,Xn, Y1, . . . , Yn) is equivalent over the canonical model to
timern(X1, . . . ,Xn, Y1, . . . , Yn).
Proof.
It is not difﬁcult to see that the axioms 1–9 of Timer translate into QTL. We want to estimate
the complexity of the translation. In each of the axioms 1–7 the formula depends in a trivial
way on the parameter i, but it clearly translates by Kamp’s theorem into a QTL formula whose
length is ﬁxed for all n and all i. Hence, the length of the conjunction over the 7 axioms and
the n indices is linear in n. Similarly, axioms 8 and 9 translate into a formula whose length does
not depend on n, i or j, so that the conjunction with i and j ranging over {1, . . . , n} is of size
O(n2). 
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Next we want to show how a QTL formula translates into a TL formula that is satisﬁable if and
only if the original formula is satisﬁable. There is an intermediate step similar to that played by
timer normal form for predicate logic. The role of the timer formula is taken by the QTL formulas
Always (X ↔ ♦1Z) and Always(X ↔←−♦ 1Z). Recall that Always(X) is the modality that states that
X always holds, with the truth table: (t0 = t0) ∧ ∀t.X(t).
Lemma 31. For every QTL formula ϕ with k metrical quantiﬁers there is a TL formula  and a
subset F of {1. . . . k} such that the size of  is linear in the size of ϕ and ϕ is satisﬁable if and only
if the conjunction of  with
∧
i∈F Always(Xi ↔ ♦1Zi) ∧
∧
i∈{1,...,k}\F Always(Xi ↔←−♦ 1Zi) is satisﬁ-
able.
Proof. The proof is by induction on k . If there are no metric quantiﬁers we are done. Assume
the claim holds for fewer than k quantiﬁers and that ϕ has k quantiﬁers. Let (say) ♦1 be an in-
nermost occurrence of a metric modality so that  is non-metric (the proof is similar when the
metric modality is different). Thus there is a formula 5(X) with k − 1 metric modalities such that
ϕ is obtained from it replacing X by ♦1 . Then ϕ is satisﬁable iff the following formula is sat-
isﬁable: 5(X) ∧ Always(Z ↔  ) ∧ Always(X ↔ ♦1Z). The formula Always(Z ↔  ) is non-metric,
and replacing 5 according to the induction assumption and rearranging the formula we obtain the
required normal form formula. 
Next we show that the metric formulas that remain in the last lemma are expressible using the
Timer formulas:
Lemma 32.
1. The formula Always (Xi ↔←−♦ 1Zi) is equivalent to Timer1(¬Xi,¬Zi).
2. The formula Always (Xi ↔ ♦1Zi) is equivalent to a simple formula in timer normal form.
Proof. The ﬁrst claim is obvious, while the second is just a restatement of Theorem 27. 
The above lemmas and Theorem 7 imply
Theorem 33. There is a polynomial time algorithm that for every QTL formula ϕ of size m with k
metrical modalities constructs a TL formula  of size O(k2 × m) such that: (1)  is satisﬁable in the
canonical model iff ϕ is satisﬁable in the canonical model.(2)  is satisﬁable in the ﬁnite variability
canonical model iff ϕ is satisﬁable in the ﬁnite variability canonical model.
This completes the reduction of QTL to TL. To use this reduction to compute the complexity of
QTL over the standard model we use the following non-metric results:
Theorem 34 (see [18]). Let  be any ﬁnite set of modalities deﬁnable in monadic ﬁrst-order logic of
order. The satisﬁability problem for TL formulas over  in the ﬁnite variability canonical model is in
PSPACE.
Theorem 35 (see [19]). Let  be any ﬁnite set of modalities deﬁnable in monadic ﬁrst-order logic of
order. The satisﬁability problem for TL formulas over  in the canonical model is in PSPACE.
Wenote here that the proofs of the above theorems is automata free and relies on the compositional
method [20].
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Corollary 36.
1. The satisﬁability problem for QTL in the ﬁnite variability canonical model is in PSPACE.
2. The satisﬁability problem for QTL in the canonical model is in PSPACE.
9.1. The complexity of MITL
In [1], an algorithm is constructed to check satisﬁability for formulas of the languageMITL, the
popular (at the time) dialect of metric temporal logic. By Theorem 4.4.1 of [1] the algorithm is in
O(2m×c×log(m×c)), where m is the largest integer mentioned in the formula and c is the number of
propositions, connectives, and modalities in the formula (or approximately its length). The tedious
construction using timed automata may lead the reader to believe that it would be difﬁcult to ﬁnd
an efﬁcient algorithm without using automata theory. Fortunately this is not the case: the natural
transformations from MITL to QTL, when done carefully allow a simple reduction to the QTL
satisﬁability algorithm.
MITL formulas are deﬁned via the syntax:
ϕ ::= X |ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2|¬ϕ|ϕ1 UI ϕ2|ϕ1 SI ϕ2|,
where I is a non-trivial (i.e., contains at least two points) open, closed or half open interval with non
negative integer endpoints. The semantics of these modalities were given in Section 7.2.
We deﬁne a natural size function for MITL: Size(X) = 1, Size(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = Size(ϕ1)+ Size(ϕ2),
Size(¬ϕ) = Size(ϕ)+ 1, Size(ϕ1 U(n,m)ϕ2) = Size(ϕ1)+ Size(ϕ2)+ n+ m. Similar deﬁnitions are giv-
en to closed and half closed intervals and to the “Since" modalities. It is clear that the Size that we
deﬁned is not larger than m× c in [1].
Theorem 37.
1. The satisﬁability problem for MITL formulae ϕ is in PSPACE(size(ϕ)).
2. The satisﬁability problem for MITL formulae ϕ in the ﬁnite variability canonical model is in
PSPACE(size(ϕ)).
The proof follows from the following lemma, and the algorithm for QTL satisﬁability, in Corol-
lary 36.
Lemma 38. There is a linear time algorithm which associates with any formula ϕ of MITL a formula
 of QTL such that ϕ is satisﬁable iff  is satisﬁable.
Proof. We saw in Section 7.2 how to reduce the two place metric modalities to simple formulas
that involve only one place metric modalities. For completeness we explicitly transform the unary
modalities that we used into QTL modalities (this was already sketched out in Section 7.1):
♦(0,m)X is equivalent to ♦1♦1 · · · ♦1X
with m diamonds.
♦(0,m]X is equivalent to ♦(0,m)X ∨ ((¬X) UX ∧ 1♦(0,m)X),
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i.e., either X occurs within m units of time or there is a ﬁrst occurrence of X (¬X UX ), and this
ﬁrst occurrence cannot be strictly farther than m units of time.
♦(n,n+m)X is equivalent to (♦11)(♦11) · · · (♦11)♦mX
with n pairs of modalities. The correctness of the translation follows by induction from the obser-
vation that ♦1Y holds at t + 1 iff (♦11)♦1Y holds at t.
♦[n,n+m)X is equivalent to ♦(n,n+m)X ∨ (n,n+1)((¬X) SX ∧ (−1,0)X),
i.e.: either X occurs in the open required interval, or there is a last occurrence of X before the open
interval, and it is not strictly smaller than n.
♦(n,n+m]X is equivalent to ♦(n,n+m)X ∨ (n+m−1,n+m)((¬X) UX ∧ ♦1X),
i.e., either X occurs in the open interval or there is a ﬁrst occurrence past the open interval, and it
is not strictly larger than n+ m. With the last two transformations it is also easy to handle the case
where the interval is closed on both sides.
From the above equivalences we obtain that X UI Y (and X SI Y ) is equivalent to aQTL formula
of size linear in the size ofX UI Y (respectively,X SI Y ). The following observation is also immediate:
Observation. If in an MITL formula  the modalities UI and SI are applied only to variables
then  is equivalent to a QTL formula of length O(size( )).
We reduce general formulas to formulas where UI and SI are applied only to variables. This
reduction is polynomial and preserves satisﬁability. Finally we apply the observation above.
Let ϕ be a formula. We denote by SUB(ϕ) the set of subformulas of ϕ and by Var (ϕ) the set
of variables that occur in ϕ. For every  ∈ SUB(ϕ) \ Var(ϕ) we introduce a fresh variable Y . For
X ∈ Var (ϕ) we use YX for X .
For  ∈ SUB(ϕ) \ Var (ϕ) we deﬁne node as follows:
node =


Y ↔ ¬Y 1 if  is ¬ 1,
Y ↔ (Y 1 ∧ Y 2) if  is  1 ∧  2,
Y ↔ Y 1 UY 2 if  is  1 U 2,
Y ↔ Y 1 SY 2 if  is  1 S 2,
Y ↔ Y 1 UI Y 2 if  is  1 UI 2,
Y ↔ Y 1 SI Y 2 if  is  1 SI 2.
We deﬁne the translation Tr(ϕ) as
Tr(ϕ) = Yϕ ∧
∧
 ∈SUB(ϕ)\Var (ϕ)
Always(node ).
It is clear that (A) ϕ is satisﬁable iff Tr(ϕ) is satisﬁable. Moreover, (B) the size of Tr(ϕ) is linear
in the size of ϕ.
In Tr(ϕ) only variables are arguments of UI and SI . Hence, Lemma 38 follows from (A), (B)
and the observation above. 
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If we avoid the introduction of new variables we get aQTL formula which is actually equivalent
to theMITL formula (and not just with regards to satisﬁability). Unfortunately we were unable to
modify the procedure to ensure that the translation will still be polynomial. Thus the search for a
polynomial translation ofMITL to QTL is still open.
However, the proof of Lemma 38 shows that when formulas are represented as dags (directed
acyclic graphs) then there is a linear time equivalence transformation between dag representations
ofMITL and QTL formulas.
10. Concluding remarks
Our aim was to get the theory of real time logic back to mainstream mathematical logic: to
use the real line itself as the canonical model and to use classical predicate logic as a framework.
Within this framework ﬁnite variability predicates and general predicates are treated uniformly,
and a natural simple metric temporal logic QTL emerges and is shown to absorb the previously
deﬁned metric constructs. We proved that this logic is decidable for ﬁnite variability predicates as
well as for general predicates by a reduction to the non-metric case. The same methods allow for
the reduction of the complexity of metric temporal formulas to non-metric formulas. The main tool
used is the reduction of metric formulas to timer normal form formulas and the reduction of timer
normal formulas to non-metric formulas. In [11], we show how the decidability of second-order logic
over ﬁnite variability models together with reduction to timer normal form give rise to stronger
decidable metric logics.
Appendix. The proof of the rescaling theorem
Let  and  be given satisfying the three conditions in the theorem. We outline the proof and
afterwards we will ﬁll in the details.
1. We deﬁne a closed set  that contains all the left points of intervals in . We will deﬁne a
partial successor function S on  so that every interval in  will have length 1. We show also
that we may assume that  is unbounded. We will ensure that the following main condition
holds:
• No small interval (in ) has length 1.
• No limit of small intervals strictly contains a unit interval.
2. It remains to extend S to a total monotone function that satisﬁes the main condition. Since  is
a closed set, its complement is a countable disjoint union of open intervals. The extension of S
will be done to one open interval at a time. By induction this extends S to all of R+.
3. Hence the main step in the proof is the following: given a closed set  with a partial successor
function S that satisﬁes the main condition, and given a closed interval [a, b] whose intersection
with  is just the two points a and b, we will extend S to a partial successor function on  ∪ [a, b]
that respects the main condition (we may assume that [a, b] is a ﬁnite interval since we make sure
that  is unbounded). To this end we concentrate on the closed interval [a, S(b)] that contains
only two unit intervals [a, S(a)] and [b, S(b)]. This will allow us to enlarge the small intervals of 
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that are contained in [a, S(b)] to larger intervals with rational endpoints, without contradicting
the main condition.
4. The actual construction now applies the Cantor back and forth argument to deﬁne S on the
rational points of [a, b] onto the rational points of [S(a), S(b)] one point at a time, retaining the
main condition. This map extends to a successor function on the set  ∪ [a, b].
Now for the details. We start by making sure that  contains intervals with arbitrary large end-
points. Otherwise there is a boundM past which there are no intervals of. LetK be a point past all
the small intervals (in ) with the leftend before M . Such a K exists by the boundedness condition
in the theorem. We may add [M ,K + 1] to  and repeat this construction by induction.
Next we add to all the limits of sequences of intervals in. The three conditions in the theorem
continue to hold as any limit of a new sequence of intervals in  is also a limit of old intervals. We
deﬁne now  to be the set of left endpoints of intervals in .  is a closed set: if a ∈  then there
is a sequence of intervals in  whose left endpoints converge to a. By the boundedness condition
their right endpoints are bounded and have a converging subsequence. This assures that a is the
left endpoint of a limit interval. Moreover, it follows from the conditions in the theorem that every
point in  is the left endpoint of a single interval in . We deﬁne now S(a) to be the right endpoint
of the unique interval of  that starts with a. Note also that  is unbounded by the modiﬁcation
that we made. It is obvious from the conditions in the theorem that the main condition of (1) holds.
We describe now the main step in the construction of S . We assume that S is deﬁned on the
closed set  and that the only points in [a, b] that are in  are a and b. We assume also that
the main condition is satisﬁed. For the moment we call small intervals intervals in  that are in-
side the interval [a, S(b)] and that are not already included in one of the two unit intervals which
are included in [a, S(b)], i.e., not subintervals of [a, S(a)] or [b, S(b)]. We show ﬁrst that we can
replace the small intervals by larger intervals with rational endpoints, without losing the main
condition. Deﬁne c = min{(a+ S(b))/2, S(a)} and d = max{(a+ S(b))/2, b}. By the main condi-
tion we may ﬁnd points a1 slightly larger than a, and b1 slightly smaller than S(b) such that all
the subintervals [8,=] of [a, S(b)] with 8 < c satisfy = < b1 and all the intervals [8,=] with d < =
satisfy a1 < 8. We change now each [8,=] with 8 < c, that is not a subinterval of [a, S(a)], to
[(a+ 8)/2,min{(2= − S(a)), d}]. We change all the intervals [8,=] with d < = that are not subinter-
vals of [b, S(b)] into [max{(28− b, d}, (= + S(b))/2]. Finally we change all the small intervals not yet
accounted for to [c, d]. The rationale behind this division is that the small intervals of the ﬁrst kind
do not endanger the main condition regarding [b, S(b)] and our measured enlarging assures that if
left endpoints converge to a then the right endpoints cannot converge to a point larger than S(a).
Similarly small intervals of the second kind do not endanger [a, S(a)] and we took care of [b, S(b)].
Small intervals of the third kind do not endanger any of the two and we could just extend them
to one small interval [c, d]. To ensure that endpoints are always rational we make sure that c and
d are rational and in every case that the enlargement does not have rational endpoints we slightly
shrink it back to obtain a proper enlargement with such endpoints.
With these preparations behind us we are ready for the actual deﬁnition of the function S on
the interval [a, b]. We will follow Cantor’s back and forth construction, recalling that any mono-
tone function from the rational points in [a, b] onto the rational points in [S(a), S(b)] extends to a
continuous map between [a, b] and [S(a), S(b)]. We start by enumerating all the rational points in
[a, b] including, and starting with, a, b (even if they are not rational). We call it the source sequence.
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We create a second sequence, the target sequence that starts with the points S(a), S(b), and enumer-
ates all the rational points in [S(a), S(b)]. We deﬁne S by induction on n so that at the nth step S
is deﬁned for 2n rationals a1, . . . , a2n (increasing in the natural order) onto the increasing sequence
b1, . . . , b2n, respectively, so that:
• a1, . . . , a2n includes at least the ﬁrst n points in the source sequence.
• b1, . . . , b2n includes at least the ﬁrst n points in the target sequence.
• The main condition holds also for the 2n unit intervals [ai, bi].
We lay the groundwork for the inductive construction with the pairs a, b and S(a), S(b). The
induction assumption holds by our assumptions on ,, and S (and our careful enlargement).
For the inductive step, let e be the ﬁrst element in the source sequence which is not yet in the
domain of S (by assumption it is at least the (n+ 1)st elements in the sequence). We extend S to
include e in its domain. Let i be such that ai < e < ai+1 (there is always such an i as a1 = a is the left
edge of the interval and a2n = b is its right edge). To retain monotonicity we can partner e with any
point in the target sequence which lies between bi and bi+1. To ensure that small intervals will re-
ceive small lengths we will choose the target more carefully: let e′ be a point such that e < e′ < ai+1.
All the small intervals with left edge smaller than e′ have right edge which is smaller than bi+1 as
[ai+1, S(ai+1)] is not strictly contained in a small interval. Moreover, since it is not strictly contained
in the limit of small sets we conclude that there is some d ′ < bi+1 which is larger than all the small
intervals that start before e′. We choose some f in the target sequence such that d ′  f < bi+1 and
deﬁne f = S(e). Also, since S(ai+1) > ai+1 we can choose the point f to be larger than ai+1 and
in particular f > e. With this deﬁnition S remains monotone on a1, . . . , a2n−1, c and the new unit
interval [e, S(e)] is not contained in any small interval. In a similar way we extend now the function
S to include in its range the ﬁrst point of the target sequence that was not yet in the range. This
concludes the inductive step. We have now amonotone function from all the rationals in [a, b] onto
all the rationals in [S(a), S(b)] and it extends to a monotone continuous function from [a, b] onto
[S(a), S(b)]. This in turn extends S from  ∪ (a, b) onto S() ∪ (S(a), S(b)). It remains to show that
our main condition holds. All the new unit intervals are strictly inside [a, S(b)] and it is clear that
only small intervals inside this interval can jeopardize the main condition. But our construction
made sure that each of them has length less than 1 (is a proper subset of a unit interval) and by
continuity of S their limit cannot be an interval larger than 1. This completes the proof. 
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